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Commerce with a bit of Ethics, or Ethics with a bit of Commerce? The Conundrum of 
British Consumer Co-operation 1863-1990 
 
“The CWS cannot afford to make itself into philanthropic institution and in doing 
business must consider more than the mere sentimental side” Co-operative Press 
Agency statement, Co-operative News 12 February 1921. 
"It is rare for Bob Dylan to license his recordings to TV ads. The decision to do so 
with the Co-operative and Blowin' in the Wind shows a willingness to embrace 
fresh ways of reaching a new audience through an ethical and fair-trade 
organisation." Mike Smith, Managing Director, Columbia records: The Guardian 
28 January 2009 
 
The last thirty years have seen a deepening concern about modern capitalism on several fronts. 
Widening national and international inequalities and poverty, growing alarm at the impact of 
incessant economic growth on the climate and environment, growing concern about the 
disproportionate power of fabulously wealthy global multinationals over nation states are just 
a few of the issues which have acquired a new urgency since the rise of ‘neo-liberal’ small state 
economics and the collapse of Soviet Communism in 1980s/1990s. The global financial crisis 
of 2008 undoubtedly gave these concerns an even greater impetus; and has fuelled a range of 
fierce responses, from the resurgence of hard left anti-capitalism, as exemplified by the 
Corbyn-led Labour Party in the UK, to strident nationalism and populism on the right, such as 
in Trump in the USA, Orban in Hungary, Salvini’s Lega Nord in Italy, Front National in France 
and AfD in Germany. On the environmentalist front, Extinction Rebellion can be seen as part 
of this wider dissatisfaction with the existing global economic system, and the victory of leave 
in the BREXIT vote has also been linked to the negative social and economic consequences of 
both the crisis and long-term policies. What these political developments have in common is a 
profound dissatisfaction with the global economic and political order – and an important part 
of that is a deepening anger at what is seen as the dubious morality of modern business. In this 
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context it is understandable and inevitable that the ethics governing business behaviour should 
attract increasing public and academic interest. 
 
This article is concerned with the historical record of one business in the UK which has 
long laid claim to the moral high ground in the conduct of its affairs – the amalgam of consumer 
co-operative  business organisations which eventually merged to become the Co-operative 
Group at the beginning of the 21st century. This is a component of British business which has 
made strong claims for its ethical contribution to the British economy in numerous ways since 
the mid-19th century. The general principle of paying dividends on the purchase of goods by 
members was intended to not only reward consumer loyalty, but to effect a wider and fairer 
distribution of profits (or ‘surplus’ as most 19th century co-operators preferred) than in the 
traditional business which rewarded the size of share-ownership. As well as other ethical 
commitments to co-operative values and principles such as promoting education for members 
(these will be outlined in the next section), the movement was to emerge as a champion of 
consumer rights, especially during the World Wars and the inter-war period, with national 
representation on the Consumers Council, as well as local involvement in food committees 
before and during the Second World War (Robertson, 2009, pp. 222-239). The movement also 
presented itself as benefitting consumers by ‘cutting out the middleman’, by creating a 
seamless supply chain of co-operatively produced food and produce (via the co-operative 
wholesales’ own factories and farms, or from other producer co-operatives), thereby reducing 
excessive profiteering, excessive spending on marketing and ensuring the best quality 
(Robertson, 2009, pp. 223-224). Following the establishment of the Co-operative Party in 1917, 
the movement also played a role in promoting legislation to protect consumer rights through 
its alliance with the Labour Party from 1927 (Robertson, 2009, pp. 228-231). 
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There exists an extensive literature on the nature of co-operative values principles and 
ethics, not least around the issue of co-operation as an expression of community identity, and 
the importance and centrality of it springing from social, local and employment milieus 
furnished and controlled by working class people (Yeo & Yeo, 1988).  More recently, 
Macpherson reiterates the point about the link between co-operation and autonomous 
community but recognises that ‘community’ is a culturally defined concept, and that 
contrasting types of communities in very different societies can form the ‘taproot’ of co-
operative organisation. More crucially, Macpherson articulates to balance co-operation seeks 
to strike between seeking the collective good and individual fulfilment; positing co-operation 
as unique in reconciling individual needs with the social (Macpherson 2011). It is a debate 
which is continuing. This article contributes to it by offering an assessment of the record of the 
British consumer co-operative movement’s efforts to abide by and promote its values and 
principles during the first 137 years of its existence (1863 to 1990). The period selected covers 
a period in which the movement rose to the zenith of its membership and market share of retail 
trade. The period after 1990 saw major restructuring in the movement which culminated in the 
creation of the Co-operative Group by 2002 as well as a revival. This will be the subject of a 
later publication. A central theme is the tension between the demands imposed by survival in 
an intensely competitive capitalist market and the desire to abide consistently by co-operative 
values and principles. The article is divided into several key sections. The next section will 
examine the provenance and nature of the ethical principles and values underpinning the British 
consumer co-operative movement – the famous ‘Rochdale Principles’ – and how these evolved 
during the 20th century. The third section will examine the changing context within which 
British consumer co-operation operated during the period, and how this affected its adherence 
to co-operative values and principles. This will include not only consideration of economic and 
social changes in British society, and in the changing wider commercial environment within 
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which the movement operated, but also examination of the evolving organisational structure of 
the movement, and how this impacted upon the ability of the movement to uphold co-operative 
principles. An important aspect of this is the movements evolving view and strategy for 
embedding co-operative values in its membership and workforce and facilitating their 
transmission to new generations. The fourth section will then bring out some of the principal 
areas of controversy during the period, considering the extent to which supporting co-operative 
values and principles was honoured or compromised, and why. The conclusion will not only 
draw together the main findings of the piece but will also set the scene for continuing the story 
after 1990 in a later article. 
 
The Rochdale Principles: Provenance, nature and evolution 
 
The establishment of the Rochdale Pioneers Equitable Society in 1844 is regarded as a 
milestone in the history of ethical business. The assortment of 28 weavers and labourers who 
established the society did so in the context of intense working-class hardship as a result of 
economic depression, poor food supplies and the hazardous living conditions which prevailed 
in most early industrial towns like Rochdale. The ‘Hungry Forties’ have become identified as 
a significant propaganda device for polemicists as well as a distinctive period of crisis by 
historians (Cobden Unwin 1904; Howe, 2016), and unsurprisingly they figure largely in the 
literature about the development of the British consumer co-operative movement. The decade 
is synonymous with a range of problems related to food, including shortages of retail outlets, 
prices inflated by unscrupulous retailers and adulterated food. In response, the ‘pioneers’, 
several of whom had experience of earlier, unsuccessful attempts to establish co-operatives, 
and others who were politically active in the Chartist movement, sought to establish their own 
consumer co-operative, which would procure the best quality produce for sale to members and 
5 
 
the wider public, and distribute profits widely to its members. In the process, the Pioneers 
established what became known as ‘the Rochdale Principles’, an enumerated list of key guiding 
rules by which the co-operative would conduct is affairs. As Rochdale became a model copied 
by the 1,000 plus co-operatives which sprang up across the United Kingdom in the next 60 
years, these principles became not only an ethical template for the British consumer co-
operative movement, but formed the basis of many of the international principles of co-
operation, most recently outlined in the International Co-operative Alliance’s (ICA) statement 
on Co-operative Identity in 1995 (https://www.ica.coop/en/cooperatives/cooperative-identity). 
As the current article sets out to evaluate the extent to which British consumer co-operation 
has been characterised by an ethical approach to business, an understanding of these values is 
a logical starting point. 
  
Before outlining the principles, it is important to grasp their provenance, as the 
circumstances and context which gave rise to them underlines an important feature of their 
‘moving spirit’. For understandable reasons the Co-operative movement reveres the Rochdale 
Pioneers, but has tended to idealise and romanticise them, as exemplified in the two films about 
the Pioneers made by the Group in 1944 (Men of Rochdale) and 2012 (The Rochdale Pioneers) 
(https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0435195/ and https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2506416/). Early 
historians of the Pioneers such as Holyoake tend to give the impression that the principles were 
a rigorous and mutually reinforcing framework of ideas which were the product of disciplined 
and theoretical planning (Hollyoake, 1893). But in reality they were an evolving work in 
progress, with some ideas, such as dividends paid on purchases, borrowed from earlier co-
operative experiments in the 1830s and 1840s, and others such as one member one-vote  
democracy, and a commitment to education, acquired from Owenite and Chartist thinking. Yet 
others were the product of experiential learning, of trial and error based on the day to day 
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running of the co-operative store. Thus, cash only trading and non-adulteration of produce for 
sale emerged out of the practical advantages of a strong reputation for safety and quality and 
effective control of bad debt. The evolutionary nature of the emerging principles is perhaps 
captured by the fact that there are different lists of principles cited in some of the early writings 
about the pioneers (Bonner, 1960; Hilson, 2017; Webster, 2019). The central point is that the 
principles were always a blend of well-intentioned idealism tempered by hard-headed 
pragmatism. From the outset, a certain hard-headed flexibility was hard-wired into the basic 
ethical precepts of British consumer co-operation. 
 
Of course, the Rochdale principles were not fossilised in amber. During the 19th and 
20th centuries, attitudes and ethical assumptions changed radically, and these resulted in 
substantial shifts in the meaning and emphasis attached to the principles. For example, attitudes 
to imperialism, race and international relations changed beyond recognition, as a result of the 
decline of empire, independence movements, the consequences of war and new aspirations for 
racial equality. Internationalism, and the notion of co-operation as a unifying force across 
national borders gained more traction over time. This was exemplified by the creation in the 
1890s of the International Co-operative Alliance, which sought – and still seeks – to develop 
co-operation as a global movement capable of transforming human social and economic 
relations along co-operative ethical lines. What then were the key founding principles of British 
consumer co-operation, as articulated by the Pioneers, and how did they evolve over the next 
150 years? It is worth setting the original principles against the 1995 ICA statement, 
highlighting how these have evolved over time, and the table below seeks to highlight the key 
points of difference: 
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The Rochdale 
Principles (late 
1840s)1 
ICA Principles 
(1995)2 
Differences/Evolved 
meaning in relation 
to the British 
consumer movement 
 Voluntary and Open 
Membership 
Implicit in the 
Pioneers early 
dealings but became 
more important as the 
numbers of retail co-
operatives grew, and 
mass memberships 
were established in the 
UK and elsewhere.  
• That the 
principle of 
‘one member 
one vote’ 
should obtain 
in government 
and the 
equality of the 
sexes in 
membership. 
• That the 
management 
should be in 
the hands of 
officers and 
committee 
elected 
periodically. 
Democratic Member 
Control 
In relation to the Co-
operative Wholesale 
Society and the Co-
operative Group, the 
nature of its 
membership began to 
change radically from 
the 1970s, as it took 
over retail societies, 
creating a hybrid 
membership of 
individual people 
(inherited from the 
retail society 
takeovers) and 
surviving independent 
retail societies. 
• That profits 
should be 
divided pro 
rata upon the 
amount of 
purchases 
made by each 
member. 
• That capital 
should be of 
their own 
providing and 
bear a fixed 
rate of interest. 
• That market 
prices should 
Member Economic 
Participation 
For practical reasons, 
the stricture on credit 
trading tended not to 
be universally 
enforced in the long 
run, for some retail 
societies to compete 
effectively with 
private shopkeepers 
who sold on credit. 
 
1 Extracted from Rochdale Pioneers’ Almanac, Rochdale Pioneers Museum’ Website 
2 See ICA Website: https://www.ica.coop/en/cooperatives/cooperative-identity 
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be charged, 
and no credit 
given nor 
asked. 
 Autonomy and 
Independence 
Political neutrality was 
an early but implicit 
Rochdale principle. 
The question of 
relationships with the 
state became more 
important as the 
movement grew, and 
the importance of legal 
status and rights 
became increasingly 
important. 
• That a definite 
percentage of 
profits should 
be allotted to 
education. 
• That frequent 
statements and 
balance sheets 
should be 
presented to 
members. 
Education, Training, 
and Information 
In addition to the 
reading rooms and 
training provided by 
individual retail 
societies, the 
establishment of the 
Co-operative College 
in 1919 exemplified 
this commitment. As 
well as training co-
operative managers 
and elected 
representatives, over 
time the college 
became involved in 
supporting the 
international co-
operative movement, 
especially in the field 
of economic 
development 
 Cooperation among 
Cooperatives 
While the original 
principles made no 
reference to this, it 
became more 
important as the 
numbers of co-
operatives grew and 
was expressed in the 
formation of 
‘umbrella’ 
organisations such as 
the Co-operative 
Union and the Co-
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operative Wholesale 
Society. Later this 
commitment to 
solidarity acquired an 
international 
dimension with the 
establishment of ICA. 
• Creation of a 
co-operative 
community 
and 
temperance 
hotel 
• That only the 
purest 
provisions 
procurable 
should be 
supplied to 
members. 
• That full 
weight and 
measure 
should be 
given. 
Concern for 
Community 
Neither of the ideas 
about an Owenite 
community or the 
temperance hotel were 
ever fulfilled. In 
addition to high 
standards of honest 
trading, the consumer 
co-operative 
movement became 
associated with a wide 
range of community-
related causes. 
 
The principles, both in their mid-19th century original manifestation, and in later 
versions were a blend of the idealistic and the pragmatic, as a review of the Rochdale principles 
demonstrates. This was especially true of what might be termed the ‘business’ principles 
governing the trading behaviour and the business model of consumer co-operative societies. 
For example, the initial prohibition of credit trading, while intended to encourage thrift and 
financial responsibility among working class members and customers, was also designed to 
protect newly established societies which would be extremely vulnerable to bad debt. It was 
also intended to wean members away from the sometimes predatory practice employed by 
some shopkeepers who used overgenerous credit to ensnare customers who would then have 
to buy from them once their debts to the shopkeeper became onerous (Fairbairn 1994, p2 & 
p10). A similar duality of purpose underpinned the principle of paying dividends based on the 
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purchases of members. It was designed to both distribute the wealth more fairly by rewarding 
members for loyalty to the society rather than on the size of their share ownership, as in private 
capitalism, and to inspire member loyalty to the society as consumers. Similarly, the pledge to 
sell only unadulterated goods of the highest quality, with honest measures, was both an ethical 
commitment and good business in terms of building consumer trust. From this perspective, it 
is important to recognise that ethics in the British consumer co-operative were closely aligned 
to the logic and demands of business in a competitive environment, and as such implied a 
certain flexibility in application and interpretation. As the next section will show, changes in 
the UK economic and social environment required that this flexibility be frequently deployed, 
while the evolving nature of the organisation of the movement and key institutions within it, 
also created stresses in ensuring adherence to co-operative principles. 
 
The Changing Context: Co-operative Structures and People, and the shifting social and 
commercial environment 1844 to 1990 
It is important to recognise that both the commercial and social environment in which the 
British consumer co-operative movement grew from the mid-19th century, and the relations 
which developed between its component institutions, had profound consequences for the 
observance of its ethics and principles. In other countries, such as Sweden, consumer co-
operation was able to grow and develop without the same degree of intense competition, as co-
operation emerged at a much earlier stage in the processes of industrialisation and urbanisation 
(Friberg, Vorberg-Rugh, Webster & Wilson, 2012, pp.243-262 and 247-254). During the late 
19th century, as the number of retail co-operative societies flourished, Britain was already 
becoming a modern industrial society, with rapidly expanding urban populations being served 
by a thriving retail sector of local shopkeepers, markets, hawkers, and even some emerging 
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modern retail chains (though these were few in number until well into the 20th century). The 
result was that competition for the newly established co-operative sector was explosively 
fierce. It involved not only ruthless price competition, but also direct political aggression 
towards co-operatives, in the form of pressure on wholesalers not to supply co-operative 
societies, leading to boycotts of supplies for societies (notably in Scotland in the 1890s, and 
moving to England in the early 1900s), the proliferation of anti-co-operative propaganda in 
retailer journals such as The Trade and Shopkeeper and even pressure on employers to take 
sanctions against active co-operators among their employees (Winstanley, 1983; Kinlock & 
Butt, 1981; Webster, 2019). In fact the creation of the co-operative wholesales had been in 
direct response to potential threats from the non-co-operative retail sector. It also meant that 
local retail co-operative societies had to be mindful of local political opinion as well as ensure 
that they were strongly competitive in terms of price and quality. As a result, local societies 
tended to be fiercely independent and committed to bolstering consumer loyalty by developing 
a range of services, from reading rooms to local social leisure events such as dances and trips. 
Gurney shows that this social and cultural aspect of local society activity was central to the 
success of the movement (Gurney, 1996, pp.199-201). But it meant that society loyalty to the 
co-operative wholesales was never as unconditional or reliable as leaders of the latter expected. 
It often made more sense both commercially and politically to source produce locally rather 
than buy from the wholesales. The result was that relations between the wholesales and some 
of their member societies were frequently tense and even hostile. This was compounded by 
frequently difficult relations between the wholesales and the Co-operative Union, especially 
over such questions as attitude to producer co-operation. The Co-operative Union was 
essentially the political forum of the movement, with its annual congress constituting a kind of 
‘parliament’ (Wilson, Webster & Vorberg-Rugh, 2013, pp70-71).  In many ways, as has been 
demonstrated, the British consumer movement was at times a highly dysfunctional federation, 
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with internal conflicts and differences over the roles and responsibilities of local societies 
frequently marring relations within the movement (Webster, 2012, pp.889-890). From the point 
of view of adherence to the ethics and principles of the movement this meant that for both local 
societies and the wholesales, commercial need frequently trumped ideological purity. 
 
In this way, the wider commercial and social milieu in which British consumer co-
operation evolved, shaped the organisational structure and institutional relationships of the 
movement, with important implications for the location of organisational responsibility for 
ensuring compliance with co-operative values and principles. Moreover, the British co-
operative movement evolved and changed in radical ways in the 19th and 20th centuries, and as 
a result identifying the organisational seat of policing its ethics is not straightforward for the 
historian. For much of its history, within the British consumer movement the ultimate sovereign 
body was the individual co-operative retail society, and as by 1900 there were over 1,000 of 
these, the scope for variation in emphasis and interpretation of the principles was huge. Of 
course there were substantial ‘umbrella’ organisations such as the Co-operative Union 
(established in 1870) and the Co-operative Wholesale Societies (English: CWS - 1863; 
Scottish: SCWS -1868), and the International Co-operative Alliance (ICA – 1895), as well as 
powerful internal pressure groups such as the Women’s Co-operative Guild (WCG - 1883) and 
educational bodies such as the Co-operative College (1919), all of which frequently expressed 
strong opinions on the nature of the movement’s principles, and the extent to which they were 
being followed. But ultimately it was the individual retail society which was the final arbiter 
for much of the movement’s history. As will be seen, there were instances where the CWS and 
SCWS openly backed away from important ethical judgements on the grounds that it had to 
defer to ‘grassroots’ society opinion. On many occasions, both wholesales asserted that it was 
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the retail societies which exercised the final authority on ethical questions, even if a single 
interpretation was not necessarily commonly held.  
 
Matters were complicated further after the Second World War, when this ‘inverted 
hierarchy’ of the sovereignty of the local society began to change, with important implications 
for observance of ethics and principles. The first development was a marked downturn in 
member engagement with local co-operative societies in the 1950s, which subsequently 
translated into declining membership (Walton, 2009, pp.13-32). Coupled with this came 
commercial decline, with the co-operative share of UK retail trade halving from 12 per cent in 
1951 to just 6.4 per cent in 1981 (Wilson, Webster, Vorberg-Rugh, 2013, p.277). Together with 
diminishing market share came retrenchment and society mergers from the 1960s (usually as a 
result of financial troubles and collapsing membership), many societies were taken over by Co-
operative Retail Services (CRS), a department of CWS which, as result of absorbing and 
running so many local societies, grew into a powerful commercial player on its own by the 
1970s. In the 1970s, CWS took over SCWS as a result of a major crisis in the bank of the 
former, and in the process, inherited numerous retail outlets which had pioneered by SCWS. 
At a stroke, CWS became a competitor with many of the amalgamated regional societies it had 
originally been created to serve. The result was that by the 1980s the location of ultimate 
sovereignty within the movement was no longer clear, and in fact the problems of rivalry, 
dysfunctionality and conflict had become even worse as CWS competed with CRS and, 
regional societies, and rifts across the movement became increasingly bitter (Wilson, Webster 
& Vorberg-Rugh, 2013, p.279-288). It was no longer clear who ultimately had responsibility 
for the behaviour of the movement, and adherence or otherwise to its founding principles. Little 
wonder that sight of the founding principles and ethics tended to be lost, especially as declining 
market share and performance stimulated a series of unsuccessful attempts to reform the 
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movement which were driven principally by commercial considerations and tended to imitate 
the mainstream retail sector. Active society members, once seen as the grassroots guardians of 
ethics and principles, were increasingly seen as irrelevant or insufficiently skilled to oversee 
executive decisions which should be guided almost exclusively by hard-headed commercial 
calculations, largely unfettered by ethical constraints. Anthony Crosland’s patronising 
observation in the 1958 Co-operative Independent Commission Report that most members 
would probably prefer to “attend to their families and gardens” exemplified this new 
professional, managerial outlook (Co-operative Independent Commission Report, 1958, p.17). 
This was compounded by significant changes in the background of the managers and 
employees of co-operatives. Before the Second World War, and for some time afterwards, 
leaders and managers within the movement tended to be drawn from the ranks of working-
class people who were frequently members of local societies, and who developed personally 
and professionally through working for the movement. The Co-operative College played a key 
role in training and educating co-operative managers, imbuing them with a strong grasp of the 
nature of co-operative values and principles. Mervyn Wilson, former Principal of the Co-
operative College, with a lifetime of service to the movement in a wide range of capacities, 
notes that his personal background was typical of upwardly mobile co-operative employees. 
He had parents who were ardent trade unionists and co-operators, and was brought up in a 
domestic environment in which co-operative values were transmitted implicitly rather than 
formally. He points out that in the early 1970s, he was one of only three graduates recruited 
from outside the movement as prospective future managers, with the vast majority rising from 
within the co-operative ranks (Interview with Mervyn Wilson, 23 October 2019). From the 
1970s this began to change radically, with more graduates and people from outside the 
movement being recruited to lead it. These changes were reflected in choices for top positions 
within the CWS. In 1967, it appointed its first CEO from outside the movement, Philip M. 
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Thomas (Wilson, Webster & Vorberg-Rugh, 2013, pp. 248-249). Thomas died tragically just 
a year later in an air crash, but the practice of looking outside the movement for leaders 
continued. Denis Landau, who rose to be CEO from 1980 to 1992, built his reputation with 
Schweppes (interview with Denis Landau, 8 July 2011). While this did not mark a complete 
abandonment of co-operative values, it did represent their dilution in the sense that among 
many of these newer employees and managers the ‘informal’ foundations of co-operative 
knowledge were much weaker or absent. In addition, in face of declining market share and 
growing difficulties, some (though not all) tended to see co-operative values as at best 
tangential to the commercial needs of the movement, and at worst inimical to them. How then, 
did these developments shape the ability and commitment of the movement – and especially 
its leading institutions – to meet and sustain its founding values and principles? 
British Consumer Co-operation and its Values & Principles 1844-1990: The Record 
So how far did the behaviour of British consumer co-operation meet the high standards set by 
the ‘Rochdale Principles’ as conceived in 1844, and by later iterations of co-operative 
principles and values? Any expectation that there is a definitive answer to this question signals 
a lack of appreciation of the severity of the tension between the commercial and ethical 
demands facing the movement. Adherence to ethical purity would have at times dictated 
decisions which would  have so undermined the consumer movement’s ability to survive in an 
increasingly hostile capitalist environment, that co-operative ethics would have been neatly – 
though honourably – buried with the commercial organisations tasked to adhere to them. That 
said, it is equally clear that the pursuit of profit in highly competitive markets, and the dynamic 
in many organisations which prioritises survival and the welfare of their owners and employees 
can all too easily trump ethical principles. The CWS and SCWS, and their members societies, 
were certainly not immune to this. Where then does the balance lie in the movement’s record 
in reconciling commercial need and ethical imperative? 
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Let us begin by identifying the positives; those areas in which the record of the 
movement stands reasonably well in its adherence to, and championing of, co-operative ethics 
and values. The movement’s adherence to the principle of dividend for members on purchase 
was undoubtedly an ideal confluence of ethical principle and shrewd commercial strategy. It 
certainly distributed the profits of co-operative societies more widely amongst its 
member/customers than mainstream businesses did for their customers (or shareholders in the 
case of larger enterprises), and the commercial success of the device was amply demonstrated 
in the wildfire spread of co-operative societies across the UK – by 1900 there were about 1200 
societies representing 1.25 million members (Wilson, Webster & Vorberg-Rugh, 2013, p.399). 
Its success was also evident in the increasing aggressive attempts by private traders to resist 
local co-operation by a range of tactics; including breaking up meetings called to form co-
operative societies, pressurising employers to discipline workers involved in consumer co-ops, 
major effort to persuade wholesalers, suppliers and customers to boycott co-op societies as well 
as major propaganda campaigns to disparage co-operation (Wilson, Webster & Vorberg-Rugh, 
2013, pp.60-61). The dividend was portrayed as a scam, the benefits being undermined by 
higher prices charged in the co-op stores compared to private shops (Winstanley, 1983, pp.85-
87). All of this was testament to the success of the ‘divi’ in building success and customer 
loyalty among members; and it continued to do so until the latter 20th century, when declining 
co-op society profits, and fierce competition from the large PLCs which dominated the retail 
grocery trade (TESCO, Sainsburys, ASDA) gradually first reduced its value and led to its 
abandonment (Wilson, Webster & Vorberg-Rugh, 2013, p.179 and p.261). Interestingly, some 
unsympathetic historians have argued that the prominence of the ‘divi’ in attracting and 
retaining members suggests that hard-headed materialism rather than ideological commitment 
on behalf of co-operative society members. But Gurney convincingly demonstrates that 
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members were attracted by other social and cultural offerings. Reading rooms, tea dances, trips 
to the seaside, mass annual festivals, all spoke to the ‘co-op’ being about much more than just 
money; it offered fellowship and a social life, and through them a personal and emotional as 
well as intellectual encounter with co-operation in everyday life (Gurney, 1996). 
 
Linked to this cultural and social aspect of co-operative society life, was the 
movement’s commitment to education, which certainly figured consistently throughout during 
the period, though perhaps more prominently in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Gurney 
shows that the informal and leisure-oriented social activities of local co-operative societies 
played a vital role in not only cementing the loyalty of the members, but also in inculcating an 
understanding of co-operative principles and values. The Co-operative Youth Movement was 
especially important in this respect (Gurney 1996). Training on the job seems to have been the 
principal way in which managers and employees were trained, initially, though in due course 
centralised, formal arrangements emerged. The establishment of the Co-operative College in 
1919 was and especially important moment, and it effectively became the ‘university’ of the 
movement, providing practical commercial education for co-operative society and 
SCWS/CWS managers, and also general educational courses which equipped co-operators and 
managers with a knowledge of social and economic history as well as the principles of co-
operation (Woodin, 2011, pp.78-95; Vernon, 2016, pp.69-89). Later in the 20th century, the 
college became increasingly dependent on funding from the co-operative wholesales, which 
tended to push the college towards provision which was directly relevant to their interests. 
Moreover, as the movement struggled with collapsing market share and failing co-operative 
societies, there was a tendency to see the requirements for an effective manager as lying in the 
mainstream training generic throughout the retail trade and private business, with far less 
emphasis upon specifically co-operative education. Nonetheless, the College continued to 
18 
 
provide courses for co-operators and managers throughout this period, though by the 1990s, it 
ceased to be a provider of courses and became more a brokerage service enabling co-operative 
societies to secure training elsewhere. But its role within international co-operation grew in 
importance. Working with UK and other central government agencies, it began to provide – 
and still provides – support for co-operators and co-operative organisations overseas, especially 
in Africa, in the form of both collaborative research and practical projects, as well as through 
advice and technical support in education (See: https://www.co-
op.ac.uk/Pages/Category/international). To some extent, this overseas engagement was a 
legacy of the immediate post Second World War period, when the assistance of the co-
operative movement, and especially the college, was sought by the Colonial Office, which had 
been tasked with promoting colonial economic development, largely in order to promote the 
dollar earning capacity of Britain’s declining empire (Webster, 2019, pp.135-136). 
 
The UK consumer co-operative movement also positioned itself as the paramount 
defender of consumer rights. From the time of the Rochdale Pioneers, a key principle had been 
that co-operative societies would sell only safe, good quality goods at fair prices. This indeed 
became one of the key selling points promoted by societies, and by the CWS and. SCWS. A 
major development in this aspect of the movement’s reputation was its representation on the 
Consumer Council set up by the British government after the First World War. In this capacity 
it campaigned tirelessly to defend consumer interests at a time of great economic difficulty in 
the domestic economy (Robertson, 2009, pp.222-239). The movement also campaigned 
fiercely against Resale Price Maintenance (RPM), the legal instrument by which manufacturers 
were able to compel retailers to sell produce at a minimum price, and which obstructed the 
movement’s policy of offering a dividend on such sales (Black, 2009, p.34). Indeed, the 
movement campaigned right up to RPM’s abolition in the early 1960s, by which time the wider 
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problems faced by British consumer co-operation undermined any advantage it derived from 
the reform. There is no doubt that the ‘co-op’s’ reputation for honest dealing continued to be 
an advantage for the movement, even during the period of contraction and decline in the later 
20th century. Indeed, with the Co-operative Bank’s adoption of a policy of ‘ethical banking’ – 
a refusal to invest or provide financial services in activities of questionable ethics (such as the 
arms trade) – in the 1980s presaged a revival of its ethical trading credentials in the 1990s, 
especially in the area of ‘Fair Trade’ (Wilson, Webster & Vorberg-Rugh, 2013,pp.319-322). 
This was to become, once again, one of the movement’s key unique selling points. 
 
In the international field, the movement’s record certainly offered examples of co-
operative solidarity, which often combined ethics with self-interest. Perhaps the most 
spectacular early example of this was the successful relationship struck by CWS and SCWS 
with the Danish co-operative sector, especially the network of farmers’ creamery co-operatives 
which came to dominate Danish butter production in the late 19th century, in the process making 
Denmark the dominant exporter of butter across Europe.3 In 1881 CWS established a branch 
in Copenhagen, and insisted on dealing directly with the Danish farmers as well as the brokers 
in the city, much to the chagrin of the latter (Grocery & Provisions Committee Minutes of the 
CWS (GPCM), 1881). The first manager of the CWS Copenhagen branch, John Andrew, 
worked assiduously to build links with the Danish co-operative movement. He became a close 
personal friend and collaborator with the President of the Danish CWS, and developed a modest 
 
3 There is an extensive literature on the Danish creamery sector. See: I. Henriksen, “Avoiding Lock in: Co-
operative Creameries in Denmark 1882-1903” ” European Review of Economic History 3 (1999) 57-78; I. 
Henriksen & K.H. O’Rourke, “Incentives, Technology  and the Shift to Year Long Dairying in Nineteenth Century 
Denmark” Economic History Review 58:3 (2005) 520-524; D.M. Higgins & M. Mordhorst, “Reputation and 
Export Performance: Danish Butter Exports and the British Market, c1880-1914” Business History 50:2 (2008) 
185-294; I. Henriksen, M. Lampe & P. Sharp, “The Role of Technology and Institutions for Growth: Danish 
Creameries in the Late Nineteenth Century” European Review of Economic History 15 (2011) 475-493; and M. 
Lampe & P. Sharpe, “How the Danes discovered Britain: The International Integration of the Danish Dairy 
Industry before 1880” European Review of Economic History 19 (2015) 432-453. 
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but useful line of commerce between the two bodies (GPCM, 4 March 1885, 2/0/5, 182; 16 
December 1885, 2/0/5, 404). But it was with the Danish farmers with whom the links were 
most important, and a steady supply of butter was purchased by CWS from the Danish farmers, 
an act of solidarity, but also a shrewd commercial reminder to the Copenhagen brokers that 
they could not impose unfavourable conditions on CWS. In 1884, some 30 per cent of CWS 
purchases by the branch was directly from Danish creameries and farmers, and though this was 
a high point, the exercise of market power was well understood by all parties (Co-operative 
Wholesale Society Board Minutes (CWSBM) 29 August 1884). The relationship between the 
British co-operative wholesales and the Danish creamery co-operative movement persisted 
well into the 20th century. 
 
After the First World War, further successful international co-operative collaborations 
were with New Zealand and Australian farmers. In February 1920, CWS established a joint 
company with the New Zealand Dairy Association, the New Zealand Produce Association 
(NZPA), to sell New Zealand butter and other produce in the UK (CWSBM 11 February 1920). 
The banking department of the CWS provided credit to enable NZPA to trade (CWSBM 7 
October 1920; 19 August 1926; 7 October 1927; 13 October 1927; 21 July 1927). By the later 
1920s, operations were extended into meat exports from New Zealand (CWSBM 21 October 
1927).  In Australia, from the early 1920s, wheat farmers in western and southern Australia 
embarked on a co-operative strategy of co-ordinating production to exert some control over 
prices through the formation of wheat pools. The Western Australia pool handled 15 million 
bushels of wheat annually, and was the largest organisation operating in that state (The Western 
Australian 23 June 1922). But such arrangements required access to a large volume of credit 
to enable farmers and the pools to weather the time lag between planting, harvest and sales, a 
facility which Australian banks initially refused to extend to them (Co-operative News, 20 
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February 1926).  The CWS bank stepped into the breach, offering very large amounts of credit 
from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s, when the Australian banks finally relented and took over 
the provision of credit, led by the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CWSBM 14 August 
1934; Report of CWS Deputation to Australia, Tasmania and New Zealand,12 October 1935 
to 11 March 1936). The amounts involved were very substantial indeed. Amounting to between 
£1 million and £3 million per annum (CWSBM 18 March 1926; 22 October 1926; 17 December 
1926; 13 April 1927; 13 October 1927; 27 September 1928; 29 October 1929). A briefer 
relationship with the south Australian wheat pool involved the provision of CWS bank credit 
of £1.5 million in 1927 (CWSBM 20 January 1927). The British CWSs benefitted from both 
interest and the supply of wheat which these advances generated. CWS also struck up an 
enduring relationship with Westralian Farmers, a farming co-operative in Western Australia, 
established in 1914 which supplied farmers with tools, warehousing, retail supplies and a range 
of other services (The Midlands Advertiser Western Australia 7 November 1913). CWS agreed 
to lend money to them to develop the provision of tractors to members (CWSBM 25 November 
1926; 20 January 1927). The Great Depression hit Australia hard, and falling commodity prices 
caused severe financial difficulties for Westralian Farmers. Nonetheless, CWS continued to 
lend to the organisation, throughout the 1930s, and agreed to reduce interest on the loans from 
5.25 per cent to 5 per cent in May 1933 (CWSBM 30 May 1933). Such policies also dovetailed 
with the prevailing government policy of the 1930s of giving preference to imperial trade 
(Webster, 2019, pp.100-111). 
 
There were also numerous instances during the interwar period of CWS helping 
overseas co-operative organisations through loans, especially in states either recovering from 
war or newly established as a result of the Treaty of Versailles or other outcomes of the First 
World War. In April 1919, £100,000 in goods on credit, as well as a loan at 3 per cent interest 
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was granted to the Belgian CWS. This was followed by credit of £600,000 to two Polish CWS 
federations, £400,000 for the Rumanian CWS, £20,000 for the Finnish CWS. £200,000 for the 
Serbian CWS and £100,000 for the Czech CWS. Some of these were at least partly guaranteed 
by the governments of these countries, demonstrating that these loans were part of post war 
state recovery and state formation strategies (CWSBM 17 July 1919; 22 August 1919; 20 
February 1920). But some of these organisations – and their state backers – proved unreliable. 
CWSs in Poland and Rumania proved to be very unreliable debtors, even with government 
backing, and their debts were only repaid by the early 1930s (Webster, 2019, p.107). As will 
be seen, this was to have important and negative consequences. In 1934, the French CWS and 
its co-operative bank was also rescued by a CWS bank loan of £100,000, which was promptly 
repaid (Co-operative News 30 June 1934, 12; CWSBM 28 April 1934; 1 October 1935). When 
it could be, the British movement was often generous in its obedience to the principle of co-
operative solidarity. 
 
There was also a strong tradition in the movement for supporting the economic 
development of the poorest British colonies, especially in Africa. This was emphatically 
displayed in West Africa in the late 1930s, where the CWS had maintained depots and 
businesses purchasing cocoa and palm oil since 1913. Several of the major companies agreed 
a cartel arrangement, whereby they collectively imposed lower prices for the cocoa they 
purchased from the planters. CWS refused to join this, and when the planters (some of whom 
were organised into co-operatives) took action to curtail the supply of cocoa, the colonial 
government became involved in the dispute (Co-operative News 29 October 1938, 1; 5 
November 1938, 13; The Producer December 1938, p.321). In February 1938 an official 
investigation by the colonial government led to the end of the cartel, and in its wake a much 
closer relationship emerged between the Colonial Office and the CWS, with the latter being 
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consulted for advice on the promotion of co-operatives in West Africa as a tool of economic 
development (Webster, 2019, p.150). The episode proved prophetic in two ways. Firstly, it in 
many ways reinforced the reputation of the movement for honest dealing, especially with those 
poorer or weaker. In many ways, the roots of later initiatives by the movement such as ethical 
banking and support for Fair Trade are evident in the West African episode (Wilson, Webster 
& Vorberg-Rugh, 2013, pp.320-325). Secondly, it helped overcome some of the suspicions 
held in the civil service that co-operation was a leftist and dangerous philosophy, paving the 
way for the British co-operative movement to be invited into state institutions to help shape 
colonial development policy. This gathered momentum following the role of the co-operative 
movement in supporting state wartime policies in the areas of rationing and overseas food 
procurement, and the election of the Labour government in 1945 (Rhodes, 2012, pp.243-251; 
Webster, 2019, p.135). While the involvement of the co-operative movement and the Co-
operative College gradually diminished with the retreat from empire, there was still a role for 
the movement in an advisory capacity in the 1960s, a presence which has not altogether 
withered, as evidenced by the work done by the Co-operative College which continued into the 
21st century (Rhodes, 2012, pp.300-305). 
 
But inevitably, the wholesales did not and could not continually live up to the values 
and principles of the movement. The demands of a highly competitive domestic retail market 
in the UK, and the need to satisfy the demands of member societies, equally pressed by 
competitive pressures, and whose loyalty to the wholesales could not be taken for granted, 
contributed to the compromise and occasional disregard for the most fundamental tenets of the 
movement. One early victim was solidarity between different forms of co-operation. The 1870s 
saw numerous attempts to develop workers co-operatives as well as consumer co-operatives. 
There were notable successes among these, especially in the cotton industry (Toms, 2012, 
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pp.855-882). But there were also ill advised and poorly executed co-operative experiments 
which failed disastrously. Most noteworthy was the ill-fated Ouseburn Co-operative Engine 
Works Company established in Newcastle in1871 in the wake of a major strike in the industry. 
Inspired by prominent local worthies such as the Reverend Dr Rutherford, the co-operative 
operated until 1875, by which time escalating losses revealed a woeful lack of managerial 
expertise (Jones, 1894, p.446-458). The English CWS was affected, incurring substantial losses 
on loans to the co-operative (Jones, 1894, p.446-458). It was the first of several such 
disappointments. Co-operative collieries proved to be notably unsound enterprises which 
absorbed CWS Bank loans, only to have to be taken over by wholesale to save them from 
liquidation (Webster, 2012, p.892).  In 1881 this precipitated an almighty row in the quarterly 
meetings of the CWS, when it emerged in June of that year that the English wholesale had 
written off £32,000 in losses on co-operatives it had taken over. The revelation sparked an 
abortive bid to forbid CWS loans to producer so-operatives, and accelerated the development 
of the wholesales as industrial producers in their own right (Webster, 2012, p.892). The legacy 
was a tendency for many consumer co-operators to see their own control over production as 
inherently superior to exclusively worker control. It was a division within the British movement 
which persisted well into the 20th century and sits uneasily with the notion of solidarity between 
different co-operative forms. 
 
This somewhat jaundiced view of the ability of workers to run their own enterprises 
acted as a bar to the idea of worker representation in decision making, either in the local retail 
societies or he wholesales. By 1939, only 80 local societies had worker representatives on their 
management committees, but the wholesales and the bulk of the movement resisted this (Cole, 
1944, pp.347-351). It also served a deep suspicion in trade union circles that retail societies 
and the wholesales in practice were little better than other employers in how they paid and 
25 
 
treated their workers. Some even accused the CWS as being an employer of sweated labour 
(Cole, 1944, p.346). There were also major industrial disputes involving the CWS and other 
co-operative societies, especially in the 1920s (Carr-Saunders, Sargent Florence & Peers, 1938, 
pp.44-45). This friction with the wider working movement, including the Labour Party has 
been examined by other historians, and it does reflect a wider uneasiness about the co-operative 
movement’s commitment to its principles. One consequence was that the co-operative 
movement enjoyed only limited success in persuading the Labour Party of the benefits of a 
wholehearted co-operative approach to the reorganisation of society, which remained firmly 
committed to the concept of state socialism (Whitecross, 2016, pp.131-150; Manton, 2007, 
pp.306-333; Manton, 2008, pp.269-286; Manton, 2009, pp. 756-778). Nonetheless, the 
movement remained loyal to its alliance with Labour, partly out of the strength of local factors, 
such as the fact that many active co-operators were also Labour members and activists, and 
that a strong sense of working class community held co-operators, trades unionists and Labour 
members together, notwithstanding differences (Robertson, 2010, pp. 218-221). Indeed, it was 
strong enough to ensure that the co-operative movement remained loyal to Labour even during 
the split which created the SDP in the early 1980s, notwithstanding the misgivings about the 
leftward turn in Labour after 1979 (Stewart, 2011, pp137-156). But Whitecross makes the point 
that it was the co-operative movement’s inability to effectively formulate and consistently press 
for an alternative vision in the 1930s which also limited its impact on the development of 
Labour Policy.  It was a trend which was reinforced by the autonomy of local retail societies, 
whose attitudes to the relationship with Labour varied hugely. It was, in its own way, a further 
illustration of how the structure of the movement hindered the development of a consistent and 
commonly held position of principle, and its capacity to translate its principles and values into 
Labour policy (Whitecross, 2016, pp.144-145). 
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More seriously, there was one episode in which the British wholesales came into direct 
conflict with other co-operators in the UK over a key issue of co-operative values and 
principles. The CWSs began purchasing large quantities of Irish butter in the 1860s, to supply 
a growing appetite for the commodity amongst British co-operative members. It opened 
branches to buy butter in Limerick (1868), Armagh, Waterford (1873), Tralee (1874) and Cork 
1877) (Webster, 2019, p.35). As shown, from the early 1880s, Denmark became a preferred 
source of butter for the wholesales, on grounds of reliability of quality and supply. But the 
growing popularity of Danish butter on the European market meant that the price was rising 
steadily (Webster, 2019, p.61). The ideal solution was for Irish farmers to imitate their Danish 
peers and form dairy creameries, and in 1889 Horace Plunkett and Robert A. Anderson 
launched their campaign to make this a reality, forming the Irish Agricultural Organisation 
Society (IAOS) in 1894, and by the following year it led 33 new dairy  co-operative societies 
in  south west Ireland. But the growth of co-operative creameries in Ireland was a slower and 
more erratic process than had been the case in Denmark. CWS initially welcomed Plunkett’s 
efforts, but by 1895 disillusion had set in. The near failure of a co-operative creamery at 
Castlemahon in 1895 prompted CWS to buy it and commence a policy of acquiring other 
creameries so that it could produce its own Irish butter (Bolger, 1983; CWSBM 25 January 
1895). The lack of faith in Irish dairy co-operation to some extent repeated the dim view of 
producer co-operatives generally displayed in 1881, and underlined the extent to which British 
consumer co-operation could at times appear to be weak in its support for other forms of co-
operation. The upshot was a running battle between the CWSs and the IAOS, as the latter 
protested ferociously that the British consumer movement was undermining the Irish 
movement (Doyle, 2019, pp. 61-65; Webster, 2019, pp.61-65). The battle raged for over ten 
years, and was fought out in meetings and conferences of the Co-operative Union, the private 
offices of government and officials and occasionally in the form of direct protest against 
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proposed CWS creameries, which threatened IAOS, supported creameries. The CWS presence 
certainly became significant, and by March 1905 it ran 38 main creameries and 50 smaller, 
auxiliary creameries. But the IAOS soon outstripped it, boasting in 1901 of representing 236 
co-operative creameries with 26,577 members (Co-operative News 2 November 1901). In 
addition, there was fierce competition from the private sector (Henriksen, McLaughlin & Sharp 
2015, p.424). Ultimately IAOS won the battle, and after 1909, CWS gradually disposed of its 
creameries, selling many of them to Irish co-operators (CWSBM 22 January 1909). But this 
was not a decision borne of any late twinge of co-operative conscience. Rather it reflected the 
fact that the experiment had proved a major financial failure. Difficulties in procuring milk at 
competitive prices, an inability to persuade Irish farmers to innovate in the field of winter 
dairying as well as problems of management all contributed to losses of £52,000 by March 
1908 (Manchester quarterly meeting March 1908; Co-operative News 21 March 1908, p325). 
In the end it was commerce rather than co-operative principle which dictated British consumer 
co-operation policy. 
 
Overseas interests also especially led the CWS into decisions which did not conform 
with co-operative principles and values. Relations with the ICA and British consumer co-
operative attitudes to some of its key initiatives in the inter-war period, proved to be especially 
problematic. The most ambitious ICA plan was the creation of an International Co-operative 
Wholesale Society (ICWS), which would be funded by national consumer co-operative 
wholesales, and supply intelligence about market conditions to both wholesales and local retail 
societies across the world, as well as selling produce to them. The idea was that by buying in 
even greater bulk, the ICWS could dramatically enhance the competitive of co-operatives 
across the globe, also in the process strengthening international solidarity within the movement. 
The idea emerged in 1919, and was given powerful impetus by the formation in July 1918 of 
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Nordilsk Andelsförbund (NAF), a joint wholesale society for Denmark, Norway, Sweden and 
Finland (from 1928) which supplied co-operative societies in these countries, with conspicuous 
success (Hilson, 2017, pp.121-129). But while the CWS and SCWS supported the 
establishment of an ICWS, they tended to see its role as advisory rather than commercial 
(CWSBM 28 August 1919; 6 November 1919). In 1928 they came out decisively against ICWS 
becoming a trading organisation (CWSBM 5 October 1928). The reasons were purely 
commercial. The British wholesales were concerned that British retail societies might choose 
to buy from ICWS rather than them – a concern that had always dominated CWS and SCWS 
thinking. But primarily, the difficulties the British wholesales had encountered in securing 
repayment of loans to European wholesales persuaded them that foreign co-operative 
movements were often unreliable business partners. There was a suspicion that as the largest 
and wealthiest consumer movement in the world, the British would end up bankrolling an 
international enterprise which, if successful, might undermine their own position in the 
domestic co-operative market; and which if not, would be likely to incur massive losses. 
Ultimately perceived commercial self-interest trumped international co-operative solidarity. Of 
course, the economic and political fallout of the Wall Street Crash and the ensuing global 
economic depression would have almost certainly have made the creation of an effective ICWS 
trading organisation extremely difficult if not impossible, as Europe especially lapsed into 
protectionism and authoritarianism. But it is important to note that British resistance predated 
this. CWS refused to support a new attempt in 1938 by ICA to revive the trading ICWS idea 
through a proposed new body, the International Co-operative Trading Agency (ICTA) 
(CWSBM 14 June 1938). The British CWSs would not always be so adamantly opposed to 
practical international co-operation, if real commercial advantage was perceived. In 1973 CWS 
joined EUROCOOP, an organisation of national co-operative wholesale organisations 
committed to promoting international trade between co-operative movements within the EEC; 
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but a widespread crisis in European consumer co-operation in the 1970s and 1980s, which 
ultimately destroyed some national institutions, ultimately limited the effectiveness of this 
organisation (A. Sugden to senior CWS management 26 September 1972). 
 
But the inter-war international sphere saw even more controversial episodes for CWS. 
The rise of Nazi Germany after 1933 and growing Japanese aggression towards China in that 
decade prompted passionate debates about CWS trade with these two countries. The 
establishment of the virulently oppressive Nazi regime in 1933, which was as aggressive 
towards German co-operation as it was to other liberal or left institutions, prompted strong calls 
from the wider labour movement in the UK for a boycott of trade with Germany, not least from 
the TUC, the Co-operative Union and even local retail societies in Southampton and Dudley 
(CWSBM 15 August 1933; 19 September 1933; 18 July 1939). But CWS refused, and 
continued to trade with Germany – albeit on a small scale right up to July 1939 (Webster, 2019, 
p.120). Similarly, there were major demands for a boycott of CWS trade with Japan following 
the latter’s attack on China in July 1937 (CWSBM 12 October 1937). Again, CWS refused. 
The reasons CWS gave in both instances are instructive. In both cases, CWS pointed to the fact 
that some member retails societies depended on trade with these countries, and that as the 
servant of its member societies, CWS was compelled to serve all of them. If individual societies 
wanted trade boycotts or other sanctions, it was up to them to implement their own actions 
(CWSBM 12 April 1938). It was a vivid illustration of the structural challenge of enforcing 
adherence to co-operative values in a movement in which 1200 separate retail societies, with 
different commercial needs, attitudes and priorities, were sovereign. The CWS response in 
Spain in the late 1930s was strikingly different. The civil war there forced CWS to abandon its 
department in Denia, and with it most of its trading interests in the country.  This allowed CWS 
to respond positively to Republican calls for aid and in 1937 it sent medical supplies and food 
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(Co-operative News 22 August 1936, p10; 6 March 1937, p.1). But the key point was that no 
material commercial interests were at stake for the British consumer co-operative movement. 
 
But arguably an even more controversial development was the emerging political and 
commercial relationship between the British movement and the new Soviet regime in Russia. 
The situation in Russia following the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917 until the early 1920s 
was fast-moving, confusing, and often unclear to western observers. The attitude of British co-
operators to the Russian crisis was shaped by two considerations. Firstly, the existing Russian 
co-operative movement was large and strong (26,000 consumer societies as well as many dairy 
and other co-operatives) but was believed to be hamstrung by the authoritarian nature of the 
Tsarist regime (Birchall, 1997, p.52). Secondly, there was a general perception that the 
Bolshevik regime was a legitimate one which represented working class interests in Russia, a 
perception which won it an initial popularity among many British co-operators and leaders. As 
a result, in early 1919 the Co-operative News published some pro-Soviet articles and voiced 
opposition to any potential British intervention in the Russian civil war against the Bolsheviks 
(Co-operative News 4 January 1919 pp,1-2; 8 February 1918 pp.98-99). In July 1919 CWS 
was also exploring the possibility of commercial links with the Rostov-on-Don Co-operative 
Society (CWSBM 25 July 1919; 8 August 1919). But very quickly disturbing intelligence 
arrived from Russia, that the Soviet regime – then in the throes of its deeply repressive policy 
of ‘War Communism,’ in which the state was seizing control of much of the economy - was 
effectively nationalising the Russian co-operative movement. Both Centrosoyus (the All 
Russian Union of Co-operative Societies) and the Moscow Narodny Bank (the Co-operative 
Bank) were taken into state control (Birchall, 1997, p.52-53; Stencel-Lensk, 1920). The deep 
hostility of the communist regime to an independent co-operative movement was underlined 
in the following year, when 11 leaders of Centrosoyus were jailed for a total of 125 years in 
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prison for alleged anti-soviet activities (Letter from E.O. Greening, Co-operative News 9 
October 1920 p.4). Edward Owen Greening, a leading co-operator took up the case of the 
imprisoned Russian co-operators in the co-operative press and movement, and for several 
months there was real confusion within the British movement about how the Soviet regime 
should be judged (Letters from E.O. Greening Co-operative News 27 November 1920  p.1; 4 
December 1920  p.1; 11 December 1920 p.1; 18 December 1920 p.3).  But decisively, in spring 
1921 Lenin announced the regime’s New Economic Policy (NEP). To enable the Soviet 
economy to recover from the desperate crisis bequeathed by the civil war and war communism, 
the regime now permitted a measure of free enterprise, including, ostensibly, the establishment 
of independent co-operatives (Service, 2011, p.314). The British wholesales, eager to seize 
advantage of the opportunities Russia offered for trade in a wide range of commodities, 
especially wheat and butter, took NEP at face value, notwithstanding the fact that Russia’s co-
operators were forced to accept effective control of the movement by the Soviet state (Webster, 
2019, pp.100-101). In the decade that followed, the CWS Bank lent money to a wide range of 
Soviet institutions, conducted an extensive trade with the regime and even helped set up and 
finance the Russo-British Grain Company to conduct trade with the USSR. This commerce 
continued into the 1930s, even when Stalin’s policies of collectivisation were wreaking havoc 
and starving millions. While after 1933, commercial relations with the USSR cooled, as the 
regime began to take a much more suspicious and hostile view of the western powers, it was 
the Soviets rather than the British movement which backed off first (Webster, 2019, pp.199-
120). It would be unfair to accuse the CWSs and the British movement of deliberately ignoring 
the repressive nature of Soviet policies in the 1920s and 1930s; they were, together with many 
others, unwitting victims of soviet propaganda and the difficulties of securing reliable 
intelligence about what was happening in the country – at least until the ghastly spectacle of 
the show trials in the late 1930s. But it has to be said that it was slow to question Soviet actions 
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and motives, even in the wake of Greening’s warnings in 1920. The commercial temptations – 
as well as the romantic notion of helping build the world’s first workers state – clouded ethical 
judgements. 
 
When surveying the later 20th century history of the British co-operative movement it 
is clear that co-operative values and principles had little room to exercise much purchase on 
decision making in the movement. The declining profitability and failure of societies, the 
falling active membership and the structural instability of the movement described in the 
second section, all acted to undermine any consistency in decision making or in the conscious 
application of principle. This was partly reflected in the tendency to try to imitate the operations 
of the non co-operative retail sector, as well as to recruit more managers from outside the 
movement, with little deep understanding of, or commitment to, co-operative values and 
principles. One incident in particular reinforced the impression of a movement in deep ethical 
trouble. The CWS and SCWS had owned tea plantations in India and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) 
since the early years of the 20th century. They had always prided themselves that working and 
living conditions were among the best offered by the tea planters. Then in September 1973, the 
Granada ITV documentary series World in Action broadcast ‘The Cost of a Cup of Tea’ which 
comprehensively condemned the treatments of workers on the wholesales’ Ceylon estates 
(Anderson, 2008, pp.26-30). While a robust defence was mounted against the allegations, it 
received little public attention (Webster, 2019, pp.161).  It seemed to epitomise a once great 
ethical business movement which had long ago lost its way. 
 
Conclusion 
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It is of course impossible to offer any calculated balance between the virtues and vices outlined 
in the last section. Several points however are clear. Firstly, that where ethical choices were 
possible, and no serious commercial interests were impaired, the movement could and usually 
did do its best to adhere to its principles – at least in the period before the severe decline set in 
after 1945. Secondly, commercial interests, however, did frequently trump ideals, not only 
because of the fiercely competitive domestic retail market in the UK, but also because of the 
intense internal pressure upon the wholesales to satisfy member societies able and willing to 
shop around competitively for supplies. Thirdly, the structures of the movement in the first 
century after the formation of CWS in 1863 made it very difficult to ensure that co-operative 
principles and values were adhered to; it was an inverted structure of over a thousand retail 
societies – a thousand masters – to which leading co-operative institutions such as the 
wholesales and the Co-operative Union had to defer. These were so diverse in their interest, 
and frequently so preoccupied with local and narrow self-interest, that no clear ethical view on 
issues were necessarily apparent. Fourthly, the situation only worsened in the later 20th century 
as the commercial plight of the movement became more acute, active membership declined, 
managers were imported with a limited grasp of co-operation as an ethical concept, and the 
movement’s structure became even less coherent and strife-ridden as a result of mergers and 
other changes. 
But this is not to say that all idealism was dead. There remained those in the movement 
who saw in co-operative values an opportunity to fashion a new niche in an increasingly 
competitive market; as a unique selling point rather than an encumbrance to be abandoned in 
favour of mainstream commercial strategies. The first shoots of this were evident in the 
emerging policies of the Co-operative Bank in the late 1980s, as it increasingly stressed its 
ethical credentials in only investing in ethically sound activities (Wilson, Webster & Vorberg-
Rugh, 2013, pp.319-322). In the 1990s, other branches of the movement would follow similar 
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approaches, and structural changes within consumer co-operation would lead to a renaissance 
of co-operative values and principles. The telling of that story will form the basis of a further 
article.  
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